

CAMERA SCRIPT

THURSDAY, 7 DECEMBER 1972

ALEXANDRA PALACE - STUDIO 'A'

PROJECT NO.: 00525/3023

RECORDING NO.: VTM/6HT/70883

O.U. REF.: A.303/7

OPEN UNIVERSITY - PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
DO WE KNOW WHAT KNOWING IS?

EXECUTIVE PRODUCER.....PETER SCROGGS
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SOUND SUPERVISOR.....JERRY LAWRENCE
SENIOR CAMERAMAN.....GORDON BLOCKLEY
CREW.....ONE
MAKE-UP ASSISTANT.....JUDY THONGER

TAKING PART

MRS. MARTHA KNEALE
PROFESSOR A. PHILLIPS GRIFFITHS
PROFESSOR GODFREY VESEY

SCHEDULE

CAMERA REHEARSAL.....1100-1300*
TELECINE.....1100-1715
Photocall.....*from 1245
Lunch.....1300-1400
Line-up.....1400-1430
RECORDING (Discontinuous).....1430-1545 (VTM/6HT/70883)
Tea break.....1545-1615
RECORDING contd.....1615-1715

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

CAMERA 1: Pedestal - zoom

CAMERA 2: " - "

CAMERA 3: " - "

MICS: 3 x 451

Tape (7" spool)

3 Floor monitors

TELECINE: 16mm from 1100 (mute)

VT playback facilities 1430-1715 (no inserts)

TELEJECTOR SLIDES

<u>NO.</u>	<u>SHOT</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
1.	3	Do we know what knowing is?
2.	3	A discussion between A. PHILLIPS GRIFFITHS Professor of Philosophy University of Warwick and MRS. MARTHA KNEALE Formerly Fellow & Tutor in Philosophy Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford.
3.	3	Introduced by PROFESSOR GODFREY VESEY
4.	5	Mrs. Martha Kneale - ident
5.	6	Prof. A. Phillips Griffiths - ident
6.	8	Taking part were Professor A. Phillips Griffiths Mrs. Martha Kneale Professor Godfrey Vesey
7.	8	Production Patricia Hodgson
8.	8	A production for the Open University BBC-tv (c) The Open University 1972

RUNNING ORDER

SHOT	PAGE	DESCRIPTION	CAMS	TIMINGS			
2.	1	TK,1: Open. titles	-	00'15"			
3.	1	TJs1-3: Titles cont.	-	00'15"			
4.	1- 2	VESEY: Intro.	2	00'30"			
5.-7.	2	VESEY: Introduces speakers & discussion	2 3 1				
AS DIR.	2	3-WAY DISC.: Pt. 1	1 2 3				
AS DIR.	3	Pt. 2	1 2 3				
AS DIR.	3	Pt. 3	1 2 3				
AS DIR.	3	Pt. 4	1 2 3				
AS DIR.	4	Pt. 5	1 2 3				
AS DIR.	4	Pt. 6(A)	1 2 3	10'00"			
AS DIR.	5	(B)	2	05'00"			
8.	5	TJs6-8: End credits	-	00'10"			

3-WAY DISCUSSION Part 6 - A & B are alternative endings.

F/U

S/B TK

- 1. A
VT CLOCK

RUN TK

- 2. TK.1 (Dur: 15") MUTE
Film: Opening titles

- 3. TJ.1
DO WE KNOW WHAT KNOWING IS?

TJ.2
A discussion between...

TJ.3
Introduced by
Prof. Godfrey Vesey

- 4. 2 A VESEY: INTRODUCES THE PROGRAMME. (Reading
MS VESEY from set book (p. 144 - Gettier). Explains
the definition of knowledge as justified
true belief.
Is this definition true?
Do we know what knowledge is?)

(3 NEXT)

(SHOT 4, on 2)

VESEY contd: INTRODUCES MRS. MARTHA KNEALE

5. 3 A
MS KNEALE and
S/I
TJ.4: Mrs. Martha Kneale - ident
T/O

PROF. A. PHILLIPS GRIFFITHS

6. 1 A
MS GRIFFITHS
S/I
TJ.5: Prof. A. Phillips Griffiths -
T/O ident

7. 2 A
3-S

AS DIRECTED

- 1 A MS, MCU, CU GRIFFITHS
2-Ss, 3-Ss
- 2 A MS, MCU, CU VESEY
3-Ss
- 3 A MS, MCU, CU KNEALE
2-Ss, 3-Ss

3-WAY DISCUSSION

THE REST OF THE PROGRAMME IS UNSCRIPTED
BUT THE FOLLOWING ARE THE POINTS THAT
WILL BE COVERED:-

(Part 1) KNEALE: (Surely this is an extraordinary
question. We couldn't even understand the
question unless we know what knowledge is.)

GRIFFITHS: (Philosophers have described
knowledge as justified true belief. But
epistemology is empty. Knowledge needn't
involve belief and doesn't require
justification.)

(AS DIRECTED)

(AS DIRECTED)

(Part 2) KNEALE: (Discussion on the use of scepticism in constructing a framework of knowledge.)

GRIFFITHS: (Qualified agreement.)

(Part 3) KNEALE: (Where scepticism has been disastrous is when justification has been taken in too narrow a sense.)

GRIFFITHS: (Agrees and goes further. The 'knower' may not be in a situation to give a justification. Explains how his view of knowledge enables us to have reasonable scientific grounds for thinking someone knows something.)

(Part 4) VESEY: (Asks for an example of the subject not being able to justify his knowledge.)

GRIFFITHS: (The chicken-sexing example.)

(AS DIRECTED)

(AS DIRECTED)

(Part 5) Major discussion & clarification of position of protagonists.

KNEALE: (Requires for knowledge that a person truly believes that he knows.)

GRIFFITHS: (A person can know without realising it.)

(Part 6) ALTERNATIVE ENDINGS

(A - 10') VESEY: (APG has said knowledge need not involve belief but has been talking in terms of belief. Does your disagreement over knowledge arise from differing views of belief? Please define belief.)

GRIFFITHS: (Brief definition of entertaining an idea with additional feeling appropriate to truth.)

KNEALE: (Major account of nature of belief.

Conclusion (Disagrees both with APG's account of belief and of knowledge.)

(B) (5'00") - /over

(AS DIRECTED)

(AS DIRECTED)

(Part 6 continued)

(B - 5') VESEY: (The narrow view of justification
leads to scepticism but does not APG's view
lead to credulity?)

8. TJ.6
Taking part were...

TJ.7
Production Patricia Hodgson

TJ.8
A production for...

FADE SOUND & VISION

A 303/7 MK

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PROGRAMME TRANSCRIPT

(A.303/7)

OPEN UNIVERSITY - ARTS

Project No: 00525/3023

DO WE KNOW WHAT KNOWING IS?

VESEY: This programme is about knowing. Do we know what knowing is? There have been some philosophers who have said we do know what knowing is. They've said that if we know some proposition, P, then P is true, we believe P and we must be justified in believing P. In other words knowledge is justified, true belief. But needless to say there are other philosophers who've disagreed with them. So do we know what knowing is? To talk about this we have Martha Kneale, formerly of Oxford and A. Phillips-Griffiths of the University of Warwick. Martha, could I begin by asking you, do we know what knowing is.

2.

(A.303/7)

MARTHA KNEALE: It seems to me an extraordinary question, if we don't know what knowing is, how can we discuss it?

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: Well, I think I understand the question, do we know what knowing is, and I think I know that we can't know what knowing is, er, because we disagree about what is is and I disagree with those philosophers who claim that knowledge is justified true belief. I won't cavil about whether if you know something it has to be true, I think there may be problems about if you know something whether you have to believe it, but I myself am pretty convinced that we are wrong in insisting that if someone knows something he must be justified in knowing that it's true and I think this is a very important disagreement because if I'm right then a great deal of what has been said in traditional epistemology can't be right because if knowledge er, must be denied to someone who is not justified in believing what he believes, then in order to know a

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: (cont'd)

man must not merely know, he must know that he knows and he must know how he knows. And presumably then if he knows how he knows he must know how he knows how he knows which suggests a kind of regress until we find some incorrigible, indubitable things that he cannot but know. Er, I believe the search for these indubitable starting points has been pretty unsuccessful and insofar as anybody has ever found anything that looks like indubitable starting points they can never get from those to the ordinary commonsense knowledge that we have.

VESEY: These indubitable starting points are er, sensation statements or something like that?

MARtha KNEALE: I should like to say something in defence of the sceptics er, who you've been attacking. Um, after all scepticism began er, as a way of correcting um unjustified claims to knowledge. People, um, claimed to know er most extraordinary things such as what the gods were like er, and the

MARTHA KNEALE: (cont'd) sceptics properly attacked them by means of the question how do you know? Now I don't think myself that er, this question 'how do you know?' er, would necessarily lead to an infinite regress to, nor to um, a starting point um, an indubitable er, starting point. There is, I think, that in order to know just as the word is used we needn't know how we know, um, we must be able to say how we know, but this saying involves only um, having a true belief

The way which we know is um, a proper and reliable way of getting to know, and I think, by the way, that scepticism has had some useful by-products. You need it to make people sceptical, for example, about their knowledge of the furniture objects around them. Before the sceptics got at them they all thought that they knew all about the furniture objects, that the whole truth was revealed to them in sight and touch and so forth and if they'd stuck to that I doubt if we'd have got, for example, the atomic theory.

5.

(A.303/7)

MARTHA KNEALE: (cont'd) Er, or we might not have got the er, heliocentric system of the solar, of astronomy if people had er, just stuck to sense experience and say, yes I know, because that's the way it looks. So scepticism did have some useful function to perform even if it er, as I don't deny, went to extravagant lengths, er, in trying to make people justify er, things which were perhaps incapable of further justification.

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: Well, I, perhaps if I could start er, answering with what you finished with which is the value of scepticism er, perhaps it has a corrective value. I wouldn't want to deny that false philosophical positions can sometimes be fruitful. Although I wonder historically how far wholesale scepticism has been useful. Healthy scepticism where people have real and proper doubts about certain claims er, in a given field, I think, is immensely valuable, but I think that the theory of knowledge is justified true belief led to a wholesale scepticism um, both in the Greeks and later

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: (cont'd)

on er, in the particularly, in the 16th and 17th centuries in Europe, er, which was anything but healthy, because it threw doubt on any way in which it would be possible to claim to know something and in fact opened the flood-gates to superstition, because what else is there to fall back on but faith and accepting the commonly er, the traditional attitudes of the day. In fact many of the sceptics used their scepticism precisely to defend traditional beliefs, but er, to get back, as it were, to the central issue, er if knowledge is justified true belief and if that leads to scepticism then, er scepticism is true. But the question I think we must ask is er, is it justified true belief? Er, to what degree does a person need to be justified in believing what he believes in order to be said to know? Now I know there is an important problem. Er, it isn't enough if someone believes something and what he believes is true. It could be a lucky accident that what he believes is true.

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: (cont'd)

We wouldn't call this knowledge and there must be some way of distinguishing - given somebody believes something - between his merely believing it and his in fact knowing it. But I think the basic difficulty has been that philosophers have thought that what the difference is must be something that the person who knows is himself aware of, or himself knows. You don't say knows, you say at least believes. Whereas it seems to me that one has an opportunity to think of, of er, having scientific theories about what people know and how they know it, if one insists there must be some factors, there must be some state of affairs which must exist applying to the person if he's to know something. Say, there must be some factors applying to him which wouldn't hold if what he believed er, weren't true, and which explains his belief and also would explain his belief and also would explain his being reliable over some range of matters of which what he believes in this particular case is one.

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: (cont'd)

But I don't see that it's necessary in order for him to know that he should know what these factors are.

VESEY: Do you want to say that he must know? I think you used the expression the way he comes to his beliefs must be a way which leads to reliable information or something like that.

MARTHA KNEALE: Yes, he must believe that. He must believe it truly, certainly er, I do agree that um, of course scepticism went too far and I think that er, this did arise from a sceptic stating too narrow a view of what constitutes justification, but er, I wouldn't interpret the narrowness quite in the way you do. The point was that they um, some sceptics at least allowed only one or at most two ways of justification. Perhaps they allowed um, only strongest sort of sceptics, allowed only justification by deductive reasoning er, from infallible first points. Er, this is obviously too narrow.

9.

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MARTHA KNEALE: (cont'd) If you ask a person how does he know, then he can answer in a number of ways. He can say, er, I know by just looking at it, I know by hearing, er, some reliable person told me, or he may say, er I know by induction, or er, in case of mathematicians, well, I have in fact deduced it er, from some axioms which are universally accepted and all these are justifications. His belief if founded on these factors, if true, would then er, be knowledge, but it seems to me that if we're going to call it knowledge, then he must have the justification. It must not just be, as you say, that there is some justification perhaps not known to him.

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS:

Well, isn't it possible for someone to find with surprise that he is right over a range of matters er, that he thought he might not be right about and er, be surprised by this and say, I wonder how I know that?

VESBY: I think we could really do with an example here to illustrate this case?

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS:

Well, I don't know how real this example is, but er I believe there are people who can tell the sex of a baby chicken just by looking at it, and it takes other people a great deal of trouble with instruments and so on to find out what is the sex of a baby chicken. Er, and if you ask them how they know, they can say oh, by looking at it, but this isn't a good enough answer because there must be more than that because other people can't tell by looking at it, and you say, well, I look at the chicken and I just know that that's a male, and they are unable to say what it is about the chicken which tells them that it's a male and I presume what is going on is that there are some small subliminal sensory cues which effect them in some way so that when they look at it, they are convinced that it is a male chicken rather than a female chicken and I think that somebody might be able to do that without knowing that they can do it. And then, people say 'What is that?', and you say, 'I think it's a male' 'Why do you think so?' 'Well I'm only saying I think it's a male - it seems to me to be a male.'

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: (cont'd)

And then after a while you are so consistently right and you say, how astonishing, I just know by looking.

MARTHA KNEALE: Yes, but the interesting point here is that the man has got to know that he's been consistently right, and this is in fact the way the chick-sexers are trained. They're shown photographs of chickens and these are photographs of chickens that have in fact grown up, so that it's known which sex they are and er, the trainer says yes or no, and rather mysteriously I agree er, in the end the man finds himself getting it right more often and more often and more often. But the very nature of the case, he must have the same justification as the outside observer for saying that he knows.

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS:

Well if that is

MARTHA KNEALE: Er, he knows that he's been right over a number of times.

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: If that's the only way in which somebody can become a chicken sexer then obviously by the time he became a chicken sexer he would have been consistently right, er, because of, as you say, the nature of the training, but if I can say unplausibly well, I don't know how anybody becomes a chicken sexer, we just find people who can do this then er, I think I'd want to say that er, even on those occasions when he didn't know that he was consistently right, but that he was convinced that it was a male just by looking at it, on the first occasion you tried it with him, this is a case where the man knew that it was a male. Er, and I'm afraid this isn't plausible because that isn't the way you tell me chicken sexers are trained. But if one found that one could do this I think one would find with surprise how on earth is it that I know these things. Now I think that one would have to believe if one were a reasonable individual, that there is some way that one knows, but one wouldn't have to know what it was.

13.

(A.303/7)

MARTHA KNEALE: Well, I wonder if one would ask that question. Would one say, how on earth er, do I know this, or would one say, er, how funny after all I get it right. Um, now, um, can there be um, something that makes me right the whole time and I think neither the person himself, nor other persons would er, say, now he knows until he er, had either indentified the factor or the thing had gone on so long that both they and the person him - the knower, the alleged knower himself were able to say well, I must know.

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: Yes, I.....

MARTHA KNEALE:

It can't be an accident. But you see the justification must be present to him, as well as to them, er, or I think he wouldn't know - well, I think he wouldn't know because, I mean, suppose you never told him the answer, and I grant you it might be a case where he did get it right over and over again, but you never told him whether he got it right, but just to amuse you he went on as he thought just guessing then I think

MARTHA KNEALE: (cont'd) er, he wouldn't know, um because he wouldn't believe when - he'd never believe, he'd say, you'd say, well, you think you got it right? He'd say, oh, I don't know, er, I can't tell. I've no reason to believe I've got it right.

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS:

It's partly for that sort of reason that I begin to wonder about the necessary connection of knowledge and belief, but I think, you see, that what you're saying is true, if one is talking about under what conditions I can rightly claim that the chicken sexer knows, or the chicken sexer can rightly claim that he knows. Um, but I'm not talking about how I would know that the chicken sexer knows, but whether it is true that he knows, and of course, I would either have to know what factors made him right, in order to say that he knows, or see that he is so consistently right that somehow there must be some factors which make him consistently right, in order that I could discover that he knows, but ^{he} could know without my discovering that he knows, just so those factors which would consistently make him right are there.

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: (cont'd)

I mean, what about this kind of case. Let's say we're discussing, oh, er, um the 1930's performance of Manchester United Football team and I say, look I'm not interested in football, I know nothing about it, and as the conversation goes on I begin to say, yes, but wasn't that the match in which there was a goal-less draw in the cup final and so on. And you say, oh yes, and it turns out that I can tell you all sorts of things about Manchester United in the 1930's and I discover that I know far more about it than I thought I knew. I must know, because it would be a tremendous coincidence that all these things I said were correct. I begin to be more confident and go on and er, now I know that if I know there must be something. Perhaps I was as a schoolboy interested in football and I've forgotten about it, or perhaps I'd been watching television Match of the Day and hearing these remarks and not taking much notice of them, but surely at this point, er (1) I could say that I know because I'm being consistently right, but not only

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: (cont'd)

can I say that I know that I'm being consistently right, it's because I'm being consistently right that I know, so that even before I got to the stage of saying I, saying I know that I know I knew, because the facts which lead me to be right in saying that I know, were there before I'd noticed them.

MARTHA KNEALE:

Oh, I think that you might equally well say, um, oh, up to the point that I realised I was getting consistently right, er, I suspected er, I believed but er, perhaps not with very great confidence, but now that I see that I'm getting consistently right, now I shall know the next answer because, just as it turns out oddly enough I'm always right. However, this is an imaginary and a very queer imaginary case, you'll allow, and I like to keep the discussion on real cases and there seems to be a kind of paradox in your position in that I think that your conditions might apply er, to er, a scientist when he was first formulating er, a theory

MARTHA KNEALE: (cont'd) which it later happened turned out to be the correct theory er, say Darwin. When Darwin was on the Beagle, when he first formulated himself the hypothesis of evolution, we all now think that he was right. I should say that surely was true that there was some factors present er, that made Darwin right, namely objective factors, the actual fact of evolution and secondly, Darwin's exceptional intelligence and insight, that made him right but Darwin himself would certainly not have claimed at that time. I rather think there's a sort of danger in your theory that if we follow it we might be attributing a knowledge to people too soon.

VESEY: Could I see if I've got the difference between you right? Um, perhaps I've misrepresented - you'll correct me if I do.

MARTHA KNEALE: Yes.

VESEY: But you are talking Martha about um, the conditions under which it is

VESEY: (cont'd) proper to say of somebody that he knows or of the person himself to say that he knows.

MARTHA KNEALE: Yes.

VESEY: That's to say, you're talking about when should we say somebody knows whereas you Griff, are talking about when does he know. You're treating knowledge as something objective, not a matter of our, of of language, of when we say people know and so on?

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: When is it true?

VESEY: True that he knows... How are you thinking of knowing then? As a state of mind, or ...?

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: Well, it would involve states of minds, but not only internal states of minds, because it will, I mean one accepts that someone knows something it must be true, and what he knows is something about the world. For him to know that the sun is bigger than the earth ... the sun's got to be bigger than the earth, so it involves more than a state of mind..

VESEY: You go along with this distinction between knowledge itself and er, what we say about people that they know or not know?

MARTHA KNEALE: Well, I think er, I wasn't wanting to draw this distinction um, just as you attributed it to me. I was wanting to say when it would be correct to say that Darwin knew the theory of evolution to be true, assuming that he did.

VESEY: When it would be correct to say he knew ...

MARTHA KNEALE: and that is the same question in my mouth as when he actually did know. When did he actually
.....

VESEY: But it's not in yours.

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: Oh no, I mean, er it may be incorrect to say things for all sorts of reasons, I mean, apart from the fact that it might be impolite, it may be incorrect for me to say it, because it's the sort of thing that I oughtn't to say until have evidence for,

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: (cont'd)

but nevertheless it may be true that it's the case, while it's not correct for me to say it. But I think actually we are talking about the same, we are talking about what has to be the case if somebody knows something.

MARTHA KNEALE: If somebody knows, certainly, and this, this last minor difference is really about the use of the word correctness, and I was using it in a very er

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: Should I perhaps respond to that very challenging case about Darwin. Er, I agree with you about the difficulty of using weird examples - things that don't happen, it's a bad habit of mine, also, but I think if necessary one could give lots of ordinary cases about people who say things like er, 'I suppose I knew all along he was not a friend of mine, but I couldn't bring myself to admit this', or something, but the Darwin case is really interesting and it's one that I find difficult to deal with and my difficulties interest me.

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS:(cont'd)

Er, at the moment when Darwin began to suspect his theory about the origin of species and about natural selection er, it may well be that much of the um, evidence that he needed he'd already got. What I think he was doing at this point was exercising his brilliant scientific imagination. He formulated a brilliant hypothesis which seemed plausible in the light of the facts. Er now, he would have said at this point that he didn't know, this for me isn't sufficient evidence that he didn't know. because I don't believe that if somebody says they don't know something it follows that they don't know, but I, of course, would agree that at this point we.. it would be false to say of him that he knew. Now how can I fit that in with what I've been saying about factors which make him right, because the factors were there and he was right. Well, I wanted to say but these must be factors which make somebody right not only in thinking that, but over some relevant or significant range of matters of that sort.

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: (cont'd)

Now, why I'm in difficulties is because I don't know how to specify any further matters of that sort, but I suppose matters make a shot at it in this case: the sort of matters here are very high level scientific theories. Now it seems quite clear that the mere exercise of scientific imagination in the situation that Darwin was in, or, is in fact, not a sufficient factor to make him or anybody else generally right about what is the case. One needs, one thinks in the, depending on one's view of the philosophy of science - to do more than perhaps the attempt to do one's best to refute this theory or, by looking for consequences of it, which one then goes to see whether they're true and after one's gone a long way doing that one then is perhaps in a better position to say, one is more likely, sorry, one is more likely given these extra factors that what one says is true. The only thing here is that I'm not even sure that I want to say now that Darwin knew the theory of evolution was right, or indeed that anybody else knows this.

23.

(A.303/7)

MARTHA KNEALE: It seems to me you're agreeing with me more than you allow, because you do think that er, belief must be justified in order to be knowledge. All the disagreement between us is you think the justification may be outside the knower. I think he must have it himself.

PHILLIPS-GRIFFITHS: Yes.

VESEY: Griff, we have to leave Martha with the last word, I'm afraid, Martha Kneale, A. Phillips-Griffiths, thank you.

MARTHA KNEALE: Thank you.